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TAXATION

Testing the Limits of Savings and Loan Tax-FreeMergers
by Patricia D. White

Harold T. and Marie B. Paulsen
V.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(Docket No. 83-832)
Argued October29, 1984
ISSUE
This case, Paulsen v. C.I.R., is of particular interest to
the savings and loan industry, and its resolution will
determine what will become of over $20 million in income taxes. More than half of the savings and loan
associations in the United States are organized as mutual
associations rather than as stock issuing organizations.
Mutual associations are owned by their account holders.
This case addresses the issue of whether, for federal
income tax purposes, the merger of a stock-type savings
and loan into a mutual association is different from the
merger of a stock-type association into another stocktype savings and loan. When two stock-type associations
merge and the shareholders of one exchange all of their
shares for shares in the other association, the shareholders do not report income even if their new shares are
worth more than they had invested in the old shares.
The question presented here is whether, in a merger of
a stock-type savings and loan into a mutual savings and
loan, a taxpayer who surrenders all stock in exchange
for an account in the mutual savings and loan is entitled
to the same favorable tax treatment.
FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Paulsen were shareholders of Commerce Savings and Loan Association. Their shares had
all of the features typically associated with the common
stock of a corporation. On July 1, 1976, Commerce was
merged into Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association. By the terms of the merger plan, each Commerce
shareholder was to receive a $12 deposit in a Citizens
passbook savings account in exchange for each share of
Commerce stock he or she owned. Shares could also be
exchanged for Citizens certificates of deposit of various
maturities. The Paulsens surrendered their 17,459
shares of Commerce stock for a Citizens passbook savPatriciaD. White is a Visiting Associate Professorof Law at the
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ings account and short-term certificates of deposit having an aggregate face value of almost $210,000. This
amount exceeded the cost of their Commerce stock by
about $153,000. The tax treatment of this gain is at issue
in this case.
Federally-chartered mutual institutions, like Citizens
Federal Savings and Loan Association, do not issue
stock. Instead, they are owned by their depositors. Each
Citizens savings account holder is entitled to one vote for
each $100 on deposit. Each borrower is entitled to one
vote. No one is entitled to more than 400 votes. In the
event of Citizen's liquidation or dissolution, its account
holders are entitled to a pro rata distribution of its assets.
Citizen's ciarter and bylaws provide that its net earnings
and any surplus are to be distributed twice yearly to its
account holders on a pro rata basis. In practice, like other
mutual savings and loans, Citizens pays a fixed and preannounced rate on all accounts.
Section 354(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that when two corporations participate in a "reorganization," no gain or loss shall be recognized to a
shareholder who exchanges stock in one of the corporations solely for stock in the other. Section 368(a)(l)(A)
defines "reorganization" to include "a statutory merger." The Paulsens contend that they fall within the
scope of section 354 since they exchanged their Commerce stock solely for ownership interests in Citizens,
and Commerce merged into Citizens. Accordingly, they
did not report their $153,000 gain as income on their
1976 federal income tax return. Instead, their position is
that recognizing the gain should be deferred until they
withdrew or otherwise disposed of the Citizens accounts
received in the merger.
On audit, the commissioner determined that the
merger was not a tax-free "reorganization" within the
scope of section 368(a)(1)(A) because it was, in substance, a sale. His position was, therefore, that the taxpayers had to recognize their $153,000 gain in 1976.
The tax court agreed with the Paulsens and held that
the merger was a "reorganization" under section
368(a)(1)(A). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed the tax court, holding that
the ownership features of the Paulsens' Citizens accounts were not sufficient to distinguish them from
ordinary savings accounts and that they were therefore
not stock but "essentially the equivalent of cash." This
holding is inconsistent with decisions on similar facts by
the Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
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Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The reorganization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code provide for the nonrecognition of gain or loss
to a taxpayer shareholder who exchanges shares of one
corporation solely for "stock or securities" in another
corporation which is a party to the reorganization. They
are designed to allow investors to continue their investment in an entity without their investment being diminished by tax when the original entity is reorganized in
some way. They are not intended to enable taxpayers to
liquidate their original investment without tax consequences. Accordingly, two judicial limitations on the
application of the statutory nonrecognition reorganization provisions developed early in their history. These
limitations have been called the "business purpose" and
"continuity of proprietary interest" doctrines. The crucial issue in this case is applying continuity of the proprietary interest doctrine to the exchange of shares for
savings accounts in the merger of a stock-type savings
and loan into a mutual savings and loan association. Do
the accounts, which are as liquid as any other savings
account, nonetheless have sufficient equity characteristics to allow them to be regarded as giving the taxpayers
a continued proprietary interest in the entity which succeeds the one in which they originally invested?
The taxpayers, not surprisingly, emphasize the fact
that all of the ownership of a mutual savings and loan
rests in its account holders. Thus, a ruling against these
taxpayers would effectively preclude mutual savings and
loan associations from acquiring a stock-type savings
and loan association in a tax-free merger. The commissioner recognizes that a ruling in his favor would have
this result, but argues that mergers like the Commerce/Citizens one are, in effect, sales for cash and ought to be
treated as such. He does not deny that all of the
ownership of Citizens rests in its account holders, but
says that the proprietary interest is of no value since the
face value of the accounts is equal to the fair market
value of the taxpayers' Commerce stock.
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case, the
courts had consistently held that mergers of this sort
were tax-free reorganizations. The Ninth Circuit's ruling and the commissioner's determination not to follow
the other courts have a significant affect on many taxpayers. Apparently, at least 671 similar cases, involving
approximately $20 million in income taxes, are pending
either administratively or in the lower courts. Obviously,
this decision will have a direct impact on those taxpayers
as well as on future mergers of stock-type savings and
loan associations into mutual associations.
ARGUMENTS
For Haroldand Marie Paulsen (Counsel of Record, William R.
Nicholas & Karen S. Bryan, 555 S. Flower Street, Los Angeles,
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CA 90071; telephone (213) 485-1234)
1. The exchange of Commerce stock for share accounts
in connection with the merger here was a stock-forstock exchange of the sort described in section
368(a)(l)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. As such,
it is a tax-free reorganization and, under section 354,
results in no current gain or loss to the taxpayers.
A. At least eleven previous Supreme Court decisions
make it clear that a bona fide combination of both the
corporate ownerships and the business operations of
two entities will qualify as a tax-free reorganization if
the transaction comes, as this one does, within the
literal terms of the Code.
B. The Ninth Circuit erred in its interpretation of the
continuity of proprietary interest test.
C. Citizens Federal's savings share accounts are equity
interests which satisfy the continuity of proprietary
interest test. Account holders hold all of the proprietary rights and interests in Citizens Federal and
are the sole owners of its assets. Both the relevant
definitional provisions of the Code and the legislative
history of sections 368 and 354 demonstrate a congressional intent that savings and loan associations
like Citizens Federal be covered by the Code's reorganization provisions. Moreover, the commissioner
himself took this position for many years until he
abruptly reversed himself in 1969 and announced for
the first time his view that a statutory merger of a
stock-type savings and loan association into a mutual
savings and loan did not qualify as a tax-free reorganization.
2. The commissioner's and Ninth Circuit's position inhibits bona fide business readjustments in an industry
which Congress has encouraged, arbitrarily discriminates against mutual savings and loan associations
(most of which are federal) in favor of stock-type
savings and loan associations, and creates uncertainty
in taxing reorganizations involving other types of
corporations.
For the Commissioner of InternalRevenue (Counsel,Jonathan S. Cohen & Kenneth L. Greene, Department of Justice,
Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 633-2217)
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the gain that the Paulsens realized in 1976
should be recognized in that same year.
1. The transaction in which the Paulsens surrendered
their Commerce stock and received a passbook savings account and certificates of deposit in Citizens was
not a reorganization; it was a sale.
A. There is no doubt that if the Paulsen's had surrendered their Commerce stock for identical consideration-a passbook savings account and time
certificates of deposit-to an ordinary corporation, a
commercial bank or a stock savings and loan association, the transfer would have been a sale and their
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gain would be immediately recognized. The result
should not be different simply because the buyer was
a mutual savings and loan association.
B. The evolution of the relevant Code provisions
reveals a deliberate congressional intent increasingly
to assimilate federally-chartered mutual savings and
loan associations like Citizens and their members to
banks and their depositors. Such associations perform an economic function substantially similar to
that governing banks. Their savings accounts arc for
all practical purposes equivalent to debt and are
treated by the Code as bank deposits and not as stock.
C. The economic realities of this merger confirm that
the Paulsen's accounts in Citizens are essentially bank
deposits. Both Citizens and the Paulsens plainly regarded the transaction as a purchase and sale.
Accordingly, there is no reason why Citizens, on the
one hand, should not take a basis in the Commerce

assets it acquired equal to the dollar obligations it has
undertaken and why the Paulsens, on the other hand,
should not be taxed on their realized gain.
2. Even if the merger was a reorganization, the Paulsens
must recognize gain up to the fair market value of the
nonequity interests that they received. The accounts
in Citizens received by the Paullsens have both stock
and nonstock features. The value of the accounts'
nonequity (nonstock) features is equal to their face
value and exceeds their realized gain. Thus, tile gain
should be recognized in full.
3. Denying reorganization treatment in this case is supported by sound considerations of' tax policy and
there are no countervailing factors in tile Paulsens'
favor.
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